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What kind of nationalism sets the
radical right and its electorate apart
from the rest? Pride in the nation’s
history as part of nationalist nostalgia
MARCEL LUBBERS
Department of Sociology, Radboud Universiteit NIDI, Nijmegen, Netherlands
ABSTRACT. This contribution concerns the nationalist ideology of the radical right
and the kind of nationalism that prevails amongst its voters. The article addresses
whether closeness to the nation, patriotism and chauvinism are relevant for people to
be attracted to the radical right compared with competing parties or whether a reference
to an out-group perceived to harm (economic or cultural) interests is necessary for
voters to opt for the radical right. The argument here is based on the ASEN lecture
at the 2018 General Conference in London and sets forth a closer interest in nationalist
nostalgia.
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Introduction
The radical right is nativist: it claims to protect the interests of an ingroup
against those of out-groups, protecting the homogeneity of the nation state
against threats by non-native elements. Despite its many definitions, few aca-
demics will doubt the centrality of nativism in the radical right party family
so neatly described in the contributions of Mudde (2007, 2017) and Rydgren
(2007, 2018). It is the combination of nationalism and xenophobia (Mudde
2007; Akkerman et al. 2016) that characterises the radical right. Before the in-
troduction of the concept nativism, the nationalist and xenophobic ideological
components were often discussed as two separate, relevant dimensions for un-
derstanding the party family. But Mudde (2007) and others significantly
discussed what kind of (confusing concept of) nationalism appeals to the typ-
ical radical right – dismissing the idea that liberal nationalism is part of the
party’s core ideology. Empirical studies, like the ones that I have published,
show that voters’ support for radical right parties is – from the demand side
perspective – foremost explained by perceived economic and in particular
cultural ethnic threats and by some kind of political dissatisfaction or protest
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(e.g. Lubbers et al. 2002; Lucassen and Lubbers 2012; Lubbers and Coenders
2017). Ivarsflaten (2008) and Rydgren (2008) summarised in their grievances
or resentment thesis that voters support the radical right because of their
resentment over immigration and its supposed harmful influence on nation
states and their resentment over non-radical right politics; politics perceived
to take an interest in itself only, bypassing ‘the people’s’ interest. These non-
radical right parties, then, are perceived as responsible for multicultural
failure since they developed the previous immigration policies, allowing too
many immigrants and demanding too little from immigrants to integrate or
to adjust.
Despite agreement on the centrality of nativism in the radical right’s ideol-
ogy and the empirical support that the perceived threat of non-native elements
to the nation state is the single most relevant explanation for voting behaviour,
I feel that this explanation does not adequately discuss to what extent nation-
alism provides a key motivation. Indeed, the radical right defines itself
regularly as nationalist (never as nativist, which is an academic concept).
The Flemish Interest Party, for instance, explicitly declares its foundation as
‘a Flemish-Nationalist party, an instrument for national and cultural identity
politics’, long since summarised in the slogan ‘Flemish First’ (VB 2018). A
Jobbik party leader in Hungary once stated that the Left and Right were oppo-
sites in historical times but that the true, current cleavage is one of being either
for or against globalisation. The Greek Golden Dawn proclaims its national-
ism explicitly as well, stating on its webpages that ‘nationalism is not a crime’.
Thus, nationalism and national identity are often mentioned in one breath and
as the core of the radical right-wing program, but how important is national-
ism and national identity for the voters?
In addressing what national identity entails, parties mostly refer to cultural
identity and argue that unique cultural features should be protected. The
Flemish Interest Party and Alternative for Germany, for example, highlight
the role of the national language in protecting national identity (VB 2018;
AfD 2016). The Dutch Party for Freedom states that norms and values, as de-
veloped in the Judeo-Christian and Humanist traditions, are dominant in the
Netherlands and should be the basis for and constitute the boundaries of
Dutch civilisation (PVV 2006a, 2006b). The Alternative for Germany also
mentions these norms and values adding the principle of Roman law on which
current rule of German law is based (AfD 2016). The parties also proclaim that
more pride in the nation is needed, which would contribute to national cohe-
sion (AfD 2016; Forum voor Democratie 2018). It often remains unspecified
who belongs to the national ingroup – or it should be the groups defined in
general terms, the French, the Dutch, the Danes and the like. Groups or cultural
features are mostly mentioned to define who or what does not belong to the na-
tional culture, for example, the German AfD states that Islam does not belong
to Germany. Taking a longitudinal perspective on the party family, it can be
noticed that which groups are defined as non-national changes over time as
well as what kind of interests are claimed to be protected by the party family.
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Radical right-wing parties (like any other party) adjust to changing circum-
stances and therefore who they target in their programs (Mudde 2007). Having
followed the Dutch radical right most closely, I have seen their focus change
from immigrants from the former colonies in the 1980s, to guest workers in
the later 1980s, to asylum seekers in the 1990s, to second generation Turks
and Moroccans in the late 1990s, to Muslims since 2001, to eastern European
immigrants around 2010, and back again to asylum seekers and Muslims in
more recent years. I was asked once to comment on a radio interview given
by the late radical right leader Hans Janmaat in the early 1980s, in which he
thought it inappropriate to have a Surinamese train driver (still a public job
at the time) and a Moroccan mayor in the Netherlands. Both have long be-
come (common) practice, and I cannot imagine that a represented radical right
party in Europe would claim that immigrants as a general category cannot be-
come public officials. This statement should be understood in the context of
the 1980s, when unemployment was high and immigrants were first and fore-
most seen as a threat to the natives’ labour market position; in contrast, I have
not seen a statement like this during the most recent economic crisis. The shift
in focus from immigrants to religious minorities – Muslims – was accompanied
by a shift from economic motivations mostly to more cultural motivations to
protect the national identity (Lucassen and Lubbers 2012). The radical right
in the Netherlands more and more positions immigrants with a Muslim back-
ground as ‘non-Dutch’, inasmuch as they adhere to religious norms long gone
in the Netherlands. Thus, immigrants with traditional gender role attitudes
and with intolerant perceptions of gays are contrasted with the progressive
and tolerant Dutch (society) (Spierings et al. 2017). Just as one cannot imagine
today that radical right parties would claim that the Surinamese cannot be-
come train drivers, in the early 1980s, one would not have predicted that the
radical right parties in 2012 would include in their program statements such
as ‘we protect our gays against advancing Islam’. The radical right in the
Nordic countries seems to have adopted a similar position. But most other rad-
ical right parties mirror the mainstream of their countries: in Eastern Europe,
they hold firm positions against homosexuality, and most Southern European
countries disapprove as well. This variance seems to reflect what is the domi-
nant norm in a society – a more progressive cultural norm in North-Western
Europe and a more traditional one in Southern and Eastern Europe. Radical
right parties, then, vary in their motivation for viewing Muslims as non-native,
as well as vary over time for who they target.
The role of nationalism amongst radical right voters
Given that nationalist ideology is at the core of the radical right party family, I
was puzzled over why we so often investigate attitudes towards immigration
(or ethnic threat) and political dissatisfaction, and so little time on the
importance of national identity, patriotism or perhaps chauvinism without
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necessarily explicitly referencing the negativity towards immigrants. The
straightforward answer is that because the ideology of the radical right does
concern nativism and hence always concerns the combination between nation-
alism and the perception towards non-native elements, the perceived threat to
the nation that should be investigated. Often nationalistic sentiments and in
particular chauvinism have been defined as just that: encompassing negativity
towards defined others. Still, the focus in empirical research on negative atti-
tudes towards defined others (mostly immigrants) does not, in the reverse, infer
that people are positive about the nation. Or that nationalism plays a role for
radical right voters to vote for the parties. Although radical right parties may
base their program on a nationalist ideology and then claim that immigrants
or Muslims (or whatever other defined out-group) harm the interest of the na-
tional ingroup (hence, being nativist), voters may step in on the latter in partic-
ular. Thus, perceived threats from immigrants or for example from the EU are
not related to the nation (as is done in the program of the radical right) but
rather are seen to harm self-interests, specific group interests or perhaps even
overarching national interests, for example, those of Western or European
culture (which by definition is not national).
I aimed to gain a better understanding of the role of nationalistic attitudes
in earlier research, even before the term nativism was coined. Together with
Peer Scheepers and Jaak Billiet, we related the role of nationalism to the the-
ory of symbolic interests (Lubbers et al. 2000). We theorised that people who
lack any feeling of belonging offered by other groups would be interested in
nationalistic ideology since belonging to the nation offers a binding function,
which is explicitly offered by radical right parties, not only because of
parties’ reference to ‘we the nation’, but also because of its strong usage of
national symbols. Few datasets I employed had strong measurements of na-
tionalism, except the Flemish data I used in the past, with good measure-
ment of Flemish nationalism (and Dutch data from the 1990s but with no
radical right voters given the lack of support at the time). We found here
that Flemish nationalism was associated with Vlaams Blok voting almost
equally as strong as the association between political dissatisfaction and vot-
ing for the party, but nothing compared with the relevance of unfavourable
out-group attitudes in understanding voting behaviour. Moreover, the spe-
cific role of Flemish nationalism in this Belgian-regionalist case made it hard
to generalise to other contexts. Raising the question again recently (Lubbers
and Coenders 2017), we tried to answer it with by then the relatively old
European Value Survey data from 2007. The measurements relating to
aspects of nationalism we could use were related to radical right voting but
rather limited, and again, nothing compared in size with the effect of anti-
immigration attitudes on radical right voting. The radical right voters, who
are the most negative about people and/or institutions that are sometimes
more or less explicitly positioned by the radical right to be non-national (im-
migrants, Muslims, the EU), do not identify themselves more than voters
from other parties as ‘a national’, do not perceive more often than voters
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from other parties the nation as the most important for who they are and do
not take the most pride in the nation. This is puzzling.
By using data from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) from
2013, I aim to provide further insights into the relation between nationalism
and voting for the radical right. I will test whether previous findings on the
(limited) role of attachment to the nation, national pride and chauvinism can
be replicated. I will provide more information on whether pride in specific do-
mains in society is related to voting for the radical right. With that informa-
tion, I can then disentangle whether radical right voters are prouder of the
nation, but in sub-domains, for example, history or sports. Moreover, the ISSP
includes an interesting measurement on whether people would like to have
more pride in the nation than they currently have. With the data, I will also as-
sess people’s perception on the role of patriotism in society to see; whether
people see it as a positive or negative contribution to society.
The U-curve
The U-curve hypothesis suggests that on the flanks of the political spectrum the
voters are close to each other in their nationalistic sentiments. Halikiopoulou
et al. (2012) found evidence for this hypothesis with political program positions
on both nationalistic ideology and the EU (and their association) on the polit-
ical extreme. Rooduijn et al. (2017) showed that radical left and radical right
voters represent a U-curve in this respect as well. Both electorates are motivated
in their voting by their Eurosceptic attitudes. When nationalism is derived from
Euroscepticism, however, the definition of nationalism includes the EU as an
outsider. It is difficult to unravel in such a situation whether radical right voters
are negative to the EU because of nationalistic sentiments or other reasons.
That said, the Halikiopoulou et al. (2012) political program analyses show
the association between Euroscepticism and nationalism. Rooduijn et al.
(2017) do find a U-curve with respect to the socio-economic profile as well: both
radical electorates are often from lower social classes and lower income groups.
AU-curve was lacking with respect to educational level, with voters for the rad-
ical left much higher educated than those amongst the radical right. A similar
conclusion is drawn by Visser et al. (2014), who compare respondents’ radical
right-wing with radical left-wing ideological positions. Moreover, the studies
from Rooduijn et al. and Visser et al. conclude that radical right – and radical
left-wing supporters differ considerably in their anti-immigration attitudes and
their egalitarian attitudes: no U-curve with respect to these attitudes. The stud-
ies discussed here all find evidence for aU-curve with respect to Euroscepticism.
In previous research, I have found that Euroscepticism on the left is motivated
by criticism on the EU’s market liberalism and its scant attention to social pol-
icies (Lubbers 2008). Taken together with the international solidarity that the
radical left in certain cases proclaims, I doubt whether a U-curve exists in na-
tionalistic attitudes amongst voters.
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National identification, patriotism and chauvinism
Since radical right parties speak to people belonging to a nation, I expect that
as a minimum, voters for the radical right perceive themselves to belong to that
national (native) group. Placing the nation in such a central position, I expect
that voters for the radical right are those for whom the nation is most impor-
tant; likely more important than any other social group; and more important
when compared with the voters of any other electorate. I expect radical right
voters not to have the most national pride though. In previous work, I formu-
lated the expectation that radical right voters are more patriotic, but that hy-
pothesis found little support (Meuleman and Lubbers 2013) likely because of
the radical right’s criticism on the current state of the nation (Betz 1994; Betz
and Johnson 2004; Meuleman and Lubbers 2013). Voters may feel they belong
to the nation, nevertheless, and perceive that the current situation is spoiled by
other politicians, thus rejecting the state and development of current society.
This situation refers to the feelings of nostalgia attributed to radical right
voters, who long for a better past (Betz and Johnson 2004). Radical right-wing
voters, then, are proud of how the nation used to be. Although the question
then arises which past is preferred by the radical right voter – the conservative,
traditional 1950s or the progressive 1970s – the bottom line is that they cur-
rently have less pride, are likely proud of something in the nation’s history
and aim to feel pride again in the entity they identify with.
Over the last decades, the radical right has made a shift in its program, in
which explicit national superiority has been replaced by protection of differ-
ences against otherness (Rydgren 2007, 2018). The radical right does not de-
scribe the nation and national as necessarily better, but as different, and
aims to preserve the difference. Although one may argue that an aim to pre-
serve a difference equals valuing that what needs to be preserved more than
that what is protected against, this is not necessarily the case. Moreover, dis-
satisfaction with the nation’s current situation amongst radical right voters
may, just as with the line of reasoning for patriotism, lower feelings of superi-
ority. Also, chauvinism may be linked to a certain past or to an ideal type of
the nation. Chauvinism may therefore have been in decline amongst radical
right voters as well because radical right parties adjusted their rhetoric to the
preservation of differences instead of hammering on superiority. Still, I expect
that perceptions of the superiority of the nation are most prominent amongst
radical right voters when compared with voters for all other electorates.
Data and analyses
In this article, I focus on the Netherlands only. What I analyse here can be eas-
ily repeated for other countries, but since I have not put forward any expecta-
tions on why the association between nationalistic attitudes and support for
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the radical right would be different between countries, I refrain from a cross-
national analysis.
The radical right’s position has been described in detail elsewhere (e.g. Van
der Veer 2006; Entzinger 2006; De Lange and Art 2011). The major change
and breakthrough in the Netherlands took place with the rise of politician
Pim Fortuyn in 2001. Fortuyn brought the topic of immigration and integra-
tion to the centre of the political arena and normalised the Netherlands in com-
parison with many other European countries in which voters had already
expressed their nativist ideology in voting behaviour. This compares with what
happened in Germany and Sweden in more recent years, in which a break-
through of the radical right took place much later than in their neighbouring
countries. In the 1980s and 1990s, there were Dutch radical right parties, but
they were perceived as (or set aside as) too extreme and incapable. After
Fortuyn’s murder in 2002, Geert Wilders has been the major representative
of the nativist agenda, with the foundation of the Party for Freedom (PVV).
Since 2006, the party (leader) has managed to draw attention with ever more
strict immigration and integration policy proposals and has become one of
the largest parties in the Dutch parliament. In the 2017 national elections,
the party did not become the largest, as the polls had been suggesting for a sub-
stantial period; rather, it came second with twenty seats to the right-wing lib-
eral party VVD, which remained in power (with thirty-three seats).
Moreover, the PVV received competition from the new Forum for Democracy
(FvD) and its party leader Thierry Baudet (two seats). The FvD positions itself
as a more intellectual nationalist party with a focus on protection of Dutch
core values, amongst which are the protection of the position of gays against
Islam. However, the party leader is critical of feminists and gender ideologies,
although those views are not mirrored in the party program. In other radical
right party programs, this opposition to gender neutrality is more explicit.
The Alternative for Germany (2016) spent a full paragraph on the topic, in
which they proposed to dismantle gender and diversity chairs at universities
and disapproved of further gender (diversity) research.
I chose to employ Dutch data from ISSP, the module on National Identity
(ISSP 2013) since this is one of the databases in which questions on national
identity and nationalism are thoroughly included (N = 1,638). These data
are from 2013 and, consequently, lack information on voting for FvD. I will
describe the differences between PVV voters and socialist (SP) voters, for
which electorates in the upward parts of the U-curve hypothesis are expected
to hold. The lower part of the U-curve should contain the voters for the liberals
(VVD), the Christian democratic/conservative electorates (CDA, CU and
SGP), social liberals (D66), social-democratic voters of the labour party
(PvdA) and green left-wing voters (GroenLinks). Respondents were asked
which party they had voted for in the 2012 national parliamentary elections.
Respondents who did not vote or provided no answer were excluded in the
analyses. The radical right (ten per cent) and labour party (twenty-four per
cent) performed better in the actual elections than in the data (seven per cent
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and sixteen per cent, respectively). At the time of the survey in 2013, both
parties were polled at a loss, possibly explaining why people refrained from
mentioning that they had voted for these parties in the 2012 elections. The so-
cial liberals performed worse in the elections of 2012 than respondents report
in the data. This result may mirror the increasing popularity of the party in
the polls at the time or indicate an overrepresentation of higher educated re-
spondents in the data, who often vote for social liberals. Previous research
demonstrated that education is a major cleavage in current voting behaviour,
with radical right voters having much lower education (Lucassen and Lubbers
2012). For that reason as well, I account for respondents’ educational level in
the analyses. By accounting for the differences in the level of education be-
tween the electorates, I describe the extent to which nationalistic attitudes re-
late to voting for a party versus voting for the radical right PVV.
I first describe how close people feel to the nation, in contrast with other
geographical areas, such as town, region or Europe. These questions were
asked of the respondents directly. Separately, respondents were also asked to
what extent they agreed with the statement ‘I feel more like a citizen of the
world than of any country’. Then, I describe to what extent the voters have
pride in the nation and show how this varies by domain, like sport, history, sci-
entific or technological achievements. Respondents were asked how much
pride they have in the Dutch (note, not how much pride they have in the
Netherlands) and how much pride they have in ten aspects about the
Netherlands. Items do not correlate over 0.45, so I did not scale the items
and examined how the electorates differ on all of these aspects.
I then tried to understand whether voters perceive the role of patriotism for
outcomes differently. Respondents were asked whether they think that patriot-
ism contributes to cohesion in Dutch society and to the Dutch reputation inter-
nationally. The answers to these two questions correlate at 0.62, which is not
very strong, but I took the two measures together as a mean score. The same
holds for the questions that ask whether respondents think that patriotism
contributes to intolerance or to unfavourable attitudes towards immigrants.
These items correlate at 0.65 and were taken together as a mean score as well.
I also aimed to see whether electorates differ in their opinion that they are less
proud of the nation than they would like to be.
Finally, I evaluated the differences between the electorates in their support
of national superiority or chauvinism, without an explicit reference to immi-
grants or the EU (although it may of course be interpreted as such by the re-
spondents). Questions asked were the extent to which people agree with
statements like: ‘I would rather be a citizen of the Netherlands than of any other
country’; ‘The world would be a better place if more people from other coun-
tries were more like the Dutch’; and ‘Generally speaking, the Netherlands is a
better country than most other countries’. These items were mean-score scaled
into a measure of chauvinism, with a Cronbach’s alpha reliability of 0.67.
Perceptions of ethnic threat were measured with three items: ‘Immigrants
take jobs away from people born in the country’; ‘Immigrants undermine
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national culture’; and ‘Immigrants increase crime rates’. The Cronbach’s alpha
for this scale was 0.78. The mean of the three items was taken to compose the
scale.
Findings
Just like in previous research, the ISSP data show that the electorate of the rad-
ical right possesses relatively low education: no other Dutch political party
electorate has as little education as the voters for the radical right PVV. More-
over, with the data, we can replicate the finding that radical right voters can be
set apart from the rest of the electorate by their strong perception of ethnic
threat or unfavourable attitudes towards immigrants (not shown). Regarding
their relation to the nation, I show to what extent the radical right is set apart
based on national attachment, national pride, relevance of national pride for
the country, preference for stronger national pride and national superiority.
For all these associations, I perform multinomial analyses and control for level
of education.
Table 1 shows that PVV voters attach (strong) feelings of closeness to the
nation, just as we expect, when the nationalist ideology resonates amongst
the electorate: eighty-three per cent feel (very) close. Also, seventy-three per
cent of the PVV voters feels (very) close to the place of living and half feels
(very) close to the province one lives. About one in five radical right voter feels
(very) close to Europe and feels like a world citizen rather than a Dutch citizen.
These findings seem to fit the expectations. However, we need to set this result
against the other electorates. On the right side of the table, each party is
contrasted to the PVV to determine whether the measurements of closeness
to a geographical area contribute positively (+), negatively () or not at all
(ns) in the likelihood of voting when comparing the two parties. Strikingly,
closeness to the nation does not discriminate between any other party and
PVV voting. This finding implies that, controlled for education (and the other
closeness attitudes), more closeness to the nation does not increase the likeli-
hood to vote for the PVV. Neither, however, does feeling close to the province
contribute to the understanding of why people vote for another party versus
the PVV. Closeness to the place one lives slightly increases the likelihood to
vote for Christians and socialists compared with a vote for the radical right.
The effect is small but surprising. Strong effects are found regarding the role
of feeling close to Europe or feeling like a world citizen. In both rows, many
plus signs are noted, meaning that the likelihood to vote for the listed party
family increases when compared with voting for the PVV when the voter feels
closer to Europe and feels a world citizen stronger. This result overall implies
that PVV voters do not express more closeness to the nation or local commu-
nities but that PVV voters, unlike all other electorates, including socialists, dis-
sociate from feeling something overarching the nation whether it be Europe or
the world.
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The radical right often claims that pride in the nation is at the basis of their
program and of relevance to national identity. Here, I find that thirty per cent
of PVV voters are proud of the Dutch, and the majority is ‘somewhat proud’.
Given the findings from previous research, I anticipated that radical right
voters would be critical of the current state of the country and therefore less
proud than other electorates. But this is not the case, even though the effects
are not very strong. The minus signs imply that with increasing pride in the
Dutch, the likelihood to vote for the listed parties decreases, compared with
a vote for the radical right. Only in contrast to the vote for Christians does na-
tional pride not discriminate. There is no U-curve effect here; also the likeli-
hood of voting for the socialists decreases in favour of the PVV when pride
in being Dutch increases.
PVV voters have little pride in the way democracy works in the
Netherlands, its political influence in the world and the country’s honest and
equal treatment of groups in society. This is rather different amongst other
electorates, which is why pride in these aspects increases the voting for most
other parties versus a vote for the radical right, but none of these aspects dis-
criminates between the radical right and each and every party electorate. From
the PVV voters, thirteen per cent show pride in Dutch arts and literature, but
this is much more prevalent amongst almost all other electorates, except lib-
erals. Increasing support for the radical right is found when voters are prouder
of sports and of Dutch history. Controlling for level of education, the more
pride a voter expresses in sports or Dutch history, the less likely (s)he votes
for another party versus the radical right (Table 2).
For some, a patriotic ideology entails something positive; for others, it re-
fers to something negative. The data show that radical right PVV voters are
more likely to acknowledge the positive side of a patriotic ideology for society
than the negative consequences. Patriotism is perceived as positive for the
Dutch international reputation and internal cohesion for fifty-seven per cent
of the PVV voters. Almost one in five PVV voters (eighteen per cent) sees pa-
triotism as negative for tolerance in society and that it may contribute to neg-
ative attitudes towards immigrants. Voters for the other parties are most likely
to be less positive and more negative, but again, this does not hold for all the
distinguished electorates. Controlling for level of education, a positive perspec-
tive on patriotism does not reduce the vote for the Christian parties in favour
of the radical right PVV. And a more negative perception on the role of patri-
otism for tolerance and immigrants does not increase the likelihood of voting
for the liberals (VVD) or social liberals (D66) compared with the radical right
PVV (Table 3).
We have seen that being proud of the Dutch, sports and history contribute
to voting for the radical right. Moreover, radical right voters perceive patriot-
ism as more positive for society and less negative for tolerance and immigrants.
But we still do not know whether they long for a country in which they can
have more pride than currently is the case. Table 4 shows that fifty-two per
cent of radical right voters agree (strongly) with the statement that the
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respondent is less proud of the Netherlands than (s)he likes to be; but this is not
a unique position for radical right voters. While accounting for differences in
level of education, I find that this attitude does not explain differences in voting
for Christians, greens and socialists on the one hand and voting for the radical
right on the other. And, for the contrast with the social liberals and social dem-
ocrats, it is just barely significant. Only when compared with the liberal VVD
voters can we find that the likelihood of voting for the radical right increases
when one is less proud than one likes to be.
The final nationalistic attitude to address is chauvinism. Chauvinism
characterises forty-four per cent of radical right voters. I anticipated that the
more chauvinistic respondents are, the lower the likelihood to vote for the
other parties when compared with the vote for the radical right (so the larger
the likelihood to vote for the radical right). This turns out to be the case only
when the parties on the left are compared with the radical right. The likelihood
of voting for social democrats, greens and socialists decreases when respon-
dents are more chauvinistic. Again, there is no support for the U-curve hypoth-
esis. The radical right cannot be set apart by its chauvinism, as chauvinism
does not explain differences in voting behaviour amongst liberals, Christian-
conservatives and social liberals versus the radical right PVV (Table 5).
Relating all the dimensions of nationalistic attitudes to voting behaviour,
while at the same time accounting for the perception of ethnic threat and level
of education, I find that the perception of ethnic threat is the strongest predic-
tor of PVV voting behaviour. The contrast between voting for the PVV and al-
most all other parties is predominantly explained by the perception of ethnic
threat. The exception is the contrast between the liberal VVD party and radical
right PVV party, in which the perception of ethnic threat plays a smaller role.
For the three strongest predictors in understanding the vote for the radical
Table 4. Less pride than is liked to be amongst PVV voters and the role of lack of
pride for the vote for a party family compared with a vote for the radical right
PVV (multinomial logistic regression analysis, with level of education as the
control).
% of
PVV
voters Liberals Christians
Social
liberals
Social
democrats Greens Socialists
Versus
PVV
(Strongly) Agree to
that I am less proud
of the Netherlands
than I like to be
52  ns   ns ns
, negative effect, p < 0.10; , negative effect, p < 0.05; , negative effect,
p < 0.001. ns, not significant.
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right versus one of the other parties, we indeed find the perception of ethnic
threat mostly listed as the strongest predictor (Table 6). Closeness to Europe
increases the vote for all other parties compared with the radical right as well.
Moreover, we see that pride in history relatively strongly diminishes the likeli-
hood to vote for the social liberals, social democrats and socialists.
Conclusions and discussion
Radical right parties focus on national identity and the protection of the nation.
However, voters for the radical right do not stand out in their feelings of close-
ness to the nation. Radical right voters are also not more locally oriented, at
Table 6. The three strongest predictors (in sequence of strength) of voting for a
Dutch party family compared with a vote for the radical right PVV in a model,
including all the nationalistic attitudes distinguished, perceptions of ethnic threat
and level of education (multinomial logistic regression analysis).
Liberals Christians Social liberals Social
democrats
Greens Socialists
Versus PVV
1 Close to
Europe
Less ethnic
threat
Less ethnic
threat
Less ethnic
threat
Less ethnic
threat
Less ethnic
threat
2 Higher
education
Close to
Europe
Close to
Europe
Less pride
in history
Close to
Europe
Less pride
in history
3 Proud
of fair
treatment
Less pride
in sports
Less pride
in history
Close to
Europe
Higher
education
Close to
Europe
Table 5. Chauvinism amongst PVV voters and the role of chauvinism for the vote
for a party family compared with a vote for the radical right PVV (multinomial
logistic regression analysis, with level of education as the control).
% of
PVV
voters Liberals Christians
Social
liberals
Social
democrats Greens Socialists
Values
≥4
Versus
PVV
(Strongly)
Chauvinistic
44 ns ns ns   
, negative effect, p < 0.10; , negative effect, p < 0.05. ns, not significant.
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least not in terms of closeness since the electorate of the radical right hardly dif-
fers from the voters for the liberals, Christians, social liberals, social democrats,
greens and socialists in their feelings of closeness to their place of living or prov-
ince in which they live. Radical right voters can be set apart from the rest in
their lack of attachment to geographical regions overarching the nation: they
dissociate from feeling European or like a world citizen.
In the Netherlands, radical right voters are amongst the electorates scoring
highest with respect to pride in being Dutch, a need for more pride in the na-
tion as well as chauvinism. But their position is not strikingly different in that
there is always another electorate that scores similar to radical right voters.
This rather descriptive analysis of the situation in the Netherlands shows
that although the nation is central to nationalistic ideology of radical right
parties, the threat framework seems more relevant than the nationalist frame-
work. Also, the data employed here show that ethnic threat and distancing
from the EU are the main drivers for the radical right vote, not so much their
closeness to the nation, their pride in the Dutch or aspects of the Netherlands,
or their chauvinism. The findings repeat the results from the European Value
Studies that found the (other) dimensions of nationalism to play a modest role
(Lubbers and Coenders 2017).
What we need to know better, however, is what radical right-wing voters
make of the nation and whether the threats that are central in radical right-
wing research are indeed seen as threats to the nation. Are immigrants seen
as threat to the nation or to personal (or specific group) interests? This question
is hard to answer empirically. Whenever respondents are asked to evaluate im-
migrants, it matters little whether it is the economic or cultural domain or if it
refers to personal, neighbourhood or national interests: if one is negative about
immigrants, it mostly comes to the fore on all these domains, on all these
levels. In empirical terms, these factors are highly correlated. We now know
that radical right-wing voters can be set apart by their anti-immigration atti-
tude, anti-EU attitudes and anti-establishment attitudes but we do not know
what interests these anti-attitudes serve, leaving the question of how national
it is?
Still, it is hard to imagine that the nation does not play a key role in
understanding the radical right’s electorate. The party programs are highly
(self-defined) nationalistic. Both positioning the country first and rejecting a
globalist ideology in favour of a patriotic agenda is key in the party pro-
grams (and explicitly mentioned by President Trump in his recent UN speech
[25 September 2018] – putting the question on the research agenda of the
difference between the United States and EU electorates). The results from
the current study suggest that radical right-wing voters relate to the nation
in a specific way. Some like to have more pride in the nation than they do
now. Sceptics may see this as a general pessimism that shows up amongst
radical right-wing voters, but the pride they express for the country’s history
shows that they long for something that the country once was. This result
makes clear why acknowledgements of the dark pages of history may cause
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so much controversy in society: if people do not feel pride in the current
nation and attach their pride to a historical version of the nation, a reinter-
pretation of that history affects the (only) positive identity people derive from
the nation. Falling of national heroes, heroic eras or national traditions,
then, affect people with nostalgia in particular. Studies from Smeekes,
Verkuyten and Martinovic (2015), for example, tried to understand what
the role of history is in the construction of national identity and national
identity threat. A study from Mann and Fenton (2017) investigated resent-
ments in classes and specifically the role of the nation in a promising way.
This importance of nostalgia, as introduced earlier by Betz (1994; Betz and
Johnson 2004) and as highlighted by Bauman (2017), should receive more
attention in future research.
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